

Institutional Individualism

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The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 2. (Jun., 1975), pp. 144-155.

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Institutional individualism

I. AN INTRODUCTORY TERMINOLOGICAL NOTE

Many of the responses to the early version of what follows included a complaint that as I had not defined my terms some difficulty in understanding my meanings was encountered. I do not wish to sound disgruntled, especially since on the whole the responses were very favourable; rather, I wish to report that the complaint puzzles me greatly since I use the terms in their traditional senses. It is possible to explain this puzzlement, perhaps, by the fact that I use terminologies and present views of opposing schools of thought so that some readers are familiar with only one part of the terms and views exposed here. For my part I doubt that many readers are not familiar with both schools of thought to the extent of knowing their terminologies. Be it as it may, here is a glossary of the chief technical terms of this essay. I do not insist on my view that my use is fairly traditional—only that it is consistent, and consistently employed in this essay, and to a larger extent than in most works on the topic which I have noticed. As far as traditional usage is concerned, confusion apart, a few authors identify the term ‘individualism’ with ‘psychologism’, whereas one of the chief points made in this paper is that the proper terms are ‘psychologistic individualism’ and ‘institutionalistic individualism’, and they label somewhat different view-points. But more on this later. Here, then, is my glossary.

1. *Individualism*: The theory which ascribes the power to act to all and only to those who have the power to decide, and which ascribes this power to all and only to individuals; not to collectives, and not to computers, etc.

2. *Psychologism*: The theory that every social theory, economics, sociology, political theory, etc., is reducible to psychology; that every social explanation can be fully explained, in its turn, by a purely psychological explanation (using only laws of psychology, and also laws of physics and biology, etc., but not of sociology etc.); that any social theory is in the final analysis a branch of psychology.

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3. *Collectivism or holism*: The doctrine that individual ends and decisions are created by social forces; thus they are constrained by social constraints and subject to conformity with the good of society at large, the *summum bonum*.

4. *Institutionalism*: The denial of psychologism; the claim that the social sciences are autonomous and not reducible to psychology: that there exist distinct social yet not psychological entities (called institutions, customs, traditions, societies, etc.).

5. A final remark on the word '*methodological*' which may be prefixed to any of the four terms defined above. Max Weber distinguished his own individualism of method from the individualism which appears in his historical studies. His term 'individualism of method' or 'individualistic methodology' was turned by Ludwig von Mises into its present form 'methodological individualism'. Popper and Hayek endorsed this usage and, with J. W. N. Watkins, they made it common. 'Methodological' is to be contrasted with 'ontological'—not so much as a thesis but as a mode of argument: when we defend a thesis by arguments from the field of (scientific) method, arguing about its fruitfulness or usefulness, etc., we use the prefix 'methodological' to characterize the thesis at hand.

This, too, seems to me to be a point on which Weber was fairly explicit:²

It is in any case a tremendous misunderstanding to assume that an individualistic methodology presupposes also an individualistic system of values. . . . Even the socialist economy would be individualistic for the purpose of sociological analysis. That is, it must be understood on the basis of individual behaviour . . . Truly empirical sociological investigation begins only with the question, what did and still does motivate the individual . . . Any formal functional analysis which uses the 'whole' as its point of departure can accomplish only preliminary preparations for further investigation; its utility and indispensability is, if it is properly applied, of course incontestable.

Here, then, Weber allows both the individuals investigated, and the investigators, to hold holistic views and to apply them. What he insists as a methodological individualist is simply that his empirical investigations centre around individual ends. This should suffice for a terminological prelude. Further clarifications will follow, I hope, in the body of my presentation. Let me conclude this introduction with this general point. I tend to consider as one of the most significant changes in twentieth-century philosophical practice, to be that of a shifting in debates concerning doctrines from ontology (theory of what there is) to methodology (theory of the study of whatever is there). It seems to me to be the joint invention of Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises—popularized and entrenched with the aid of Hayek and Popper, to be sure.³

II. INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS HOLISM

When the individualist contends that only individuals are responsible actors on the social and historical stage, the holist retorts that society is more than merely a collection of individuals. To this retort the individualist answers that there is no mysterious additional entity which turns a collection of individuals into a society; a collection of individuals is a society if there is strong interaction between them; this interaction is due to the fact that when any one individual acts (rationally) on the basis of his own aims and interests, he takes into account the existence of other individuals with aims and interests. To this the holist retorts that the individualist misses the point; that people's aims do not constitute a society but rather depend on society; so that members of different societies have different aims and interests. The individualist in turn answers that the holist misses the point, by taking the social setting as God-given rather than as explicable in terms of human action. The holist in turn argues that human action does not determine but is rather constrained by, or directed by, the social setting (perhaps because social forces are much stronger than any single individual).

This argument may be schematized in the following manner in an attempt to characterize the two traditional views.

(a) Holism	(b) Individualism
1. Society is the 'whole' which is more than its parts (holism).	Only individuals have aims and interests (individualism).
2. 'Society' affects the individual's aims (collectivism).	The individual behaves in a way adequate to his aim, given his circumstances (rationality principle).
3. The social set-up influences and constrains the individual's behaviour (institutional analysis).	The social set-up is changeable as a result of individuals' action (institutional reform).

It is obvious that here we have a characterization of two different positions. Yet so far the characterization is not sufficient to bring out the fact that these two positions are mutually incompatible. Traditionally, many individualists have refused to assume the existence of any social entity *because* they assumed that only individuals can have aims and interests. They viewed 'the national interest', 'public policy', and such-like expressions either as empty or as mere shorthand expressions for sum-totals of many individuals' interests and policies. The holists, however, have traditionally insisted that national aims, class-interests, and *destinies of social groups* do exist. Logically this amounts to altering our schema in the following way: we add to *both* views, holism *and* individualism, the following proposition, and reinterpret the other propositions in its light.

4. *If* 'wholes' exist *then* they have distinct aims and interests of their own.

The reason proposition 4 was introduced is that it renders proposition 1(*a*) inconsistent with 1(*b*); that is to say, from 1(*a*) and 4 we can deduce that 1(*b*) is false and from 1(*b*) and 4 we can deduce that 1(*a*) is false. Strictly formally, we cannot do the same with 2(*a*) and 2(*b*), or with 3(*a*) and 3(*b*). Yet it is very easy to interpret 2(*a*) and 2(*b*) in the manner in which 4 will render them inconsistent with each other; and the same for 3(*a*) and 3(*b*). Moreover, it is easy to observe that this interpretation is adequate, namely, that it is the intended interpretation (as logicians will say); much evidence can be elicited from the literature to support the claim that this interpretation makes the propositions 2(*a*) to 3(*b*) nearer to what many traditional writers had in mind. Let us take this briefly step by step. The individualist does not deny 2(*a*) (collectivism), when it is interpreted contrary to 4: he denies 2(*a*) when it is interpreted in accord with 4. That is to say, he does not deny that one's aims can be affected by others' aims, and he can explain rationally such phenomena; yet he merely denies that one's aims can be explained by reference to some overbearing social force or social aim. Similarly, the holist does not deny 2(*b*) (rationality principle) when it is interpreted contrary to 4; he denies 2(*b*) when it is interpreted in accord with 4. That is to say, he does not deny that the individual acts purposefully (rationally). He merely denies that individuals' aims and physical circumstances alone determine human action. He insists, contrary to the individualist, that the aims of the social group exist, apart from the aims of each individual. And these social forces or aims constitute a major factor in determining the actions of its members. Again, the individualist does not deny 3(*a*) (institutional analysis) when it is interpreted contrary to 4; he denies 3(*a*) when it is interpreted according to 4. He does not deny that the behaviour of any individual is constrained and influenced by social factors, provided that we can explain such constraints and influences as results of the presence and choices of other individuals. Only when the holist attributes these social constraints and influences to the social group as above and beyond its members, or to the aim of the social group as above and beyond the aims of its individual members—only then does the individualist disagree with the collectivist. Similarly as to 3(*b*) (institutional reform): the holist does not deny it when it is interpreted contrary to 4; he denies it when it is interpreted in accord with 4. The holist denies 3(*b*) only when the set-up which the individual supposedly changes is the 'society' or the social group—this is to say society's aims and destinies; he will not deny that the individual can alter his material environment, or other individuals' tastes, and similar 'superficial' factors.

Thus, proposition 4 renders the previous propositions more definite by interpreting holism as the view according to which the individual's interest is bound to the existing social interest, and individualism as the

view that *only* individuals exist and have interests. This form of individualism is known as *psychologistic* individualism, or as individualistic psychologism.

Proposition 4 is not explicitly stated by writers on the present controversy, and it is not the only proposition which renders the two sides of our schema incompatible with each other. However, it is often implicit in many works on the controversy, old and new. Indeed it is sometimes so obviously implicit in these works that I find it a little puzzling that so few people have noticed it and have found it worthy of comment. Whether proposition 4 is acceptable or not, refraining from stating it explicitly may easily lead to confusion. It is one thing to state explicitly that all individualism is psychologistic and quite another thing to confuse individualism with psychologism.

Psychologism, however, conflicts with institutionalism in the same manner in which individualism conflicts with holism. Let me present this conflict in some detail as well, much along the same lines as I have presented the conflict between holism and individualism.

III. PSYCHOLOGISM VERSUS INSTITUTIONALISM

Historically, psychologism was taken as the basis of social science without much debate, indeed almost as an article of faith, by analogy to the claim that atomism has to be taken as the basis of the physical sciences. In reaction to psychologism, followers of institutionalism declare that certain social entities exist, and are of primary importance to the social sciences, even though their very existence is denied by psychologism. Examples for such social entities were tradition according to Edmund Burke and the state according to Hegel. These social entities were wholes which could not be described as merely collections of the individuals who happen to partake in them. Cultures for example, say some institutionalists, are at best reflected in the individual minds which partake in them; but even ideally, if we ever could piece together, through the study of the psychology of individual persons viewed in masses, an adequate image of the culture they partake in, still the reflection will not be identical with the thing reflected. The adherent to psychologism finds this doctrine oppressive and morally objectionable: society is subject to criticisms of individuals and is not a blanket under which they live. To this the advocate of institutionalism may retort that it is psychologism which preaches moral irresponsibility and sheer hedonism: the basic moral duty of the individual, the institutionalist may say, is to the society to which the individual belongs and owes his loyalty. To this the holder of psychologistic view will retort that it is the individual's right and duty to determine his society, not merely to accept it. Again, the institutionalist may retort to this by observing that society determines the

individual rather than the other way around, as ample comparative studies, anthropological and sociological, confirm with much regularity.

We see here that on one point both individualist and institutionalist seem to agree: if we can explain a society, or a social institution, by the mere reference to the (psychology of the) individuals who partake in it, then it is not basic; otherwise it is. Let us use the words 'primary' and 'reducible' to describe the impossibility or the possibility of explaining something in terms of something else.

Let us now schematize this little debate further in the manner attempted above. Again, we have three couples of theses made to clash with the help of an additional thesis:

- | | |
|--|--|
| (c) <i>Institutionalism</i> | (d) <i>Psychologism</i> |
| 1. Society is the primary social entity (institutionalism). | The individual is the primary social entity (psychologism). |
| 2. One's primary duty is to one's society (collectivist morality). | Society is subject to criticism of individual conscience (autonomy of morals). |
| 3. Social conditions affect individual conditions (collectivism). | Individuals affect social conditions (institutional reform). |

The first point to clear about all this is the way morality enters a theory of explanation. No one denies that both collectivist morality and individualist morality have been preached in the past. The question at bay is not only which is the right morality, but also which one should a social scientist employ in his social explanation. For, it is rather agreed by both parties (quite erroneously, I think) that a social scientist should employ the right moral theory in his explanation if and when moral values play a role in human conduct. Both parties agree that the wrong morality, when applied, can usually lead only to some friction; the collectivist sees in the application of individualist ethics not a significant factor but, at most, a bothersome friction—unless it leads to the total destruction of a society; and *mutatis mutandis* for the individualist.

To return to the contrast between institutionalism and psychologism in general, in order to render 1(c) and 1(d) incompatible, we add to *both* sides an additional premise:

5. Either society is primary, or the individual is primary, but not both.

The reason proposition 5 was introduced is that it renders proposition 1(c) inconsistent with 1(d). That is to say, if proposition 5 is not asserted, one may consistently assert both 1(c) and 1(d), but if proposition 5 is asserted together with proposition 1(c) then proposition 1(d) is thereby denied, just as if proposition 5 is asserted together with proposition 1(d), then proposition 1(c) is thereby denied. Again, it will be seen, propositions 2(c) and 2(d) are not contested by anyone, unless they are interpreted in accord with the constraining additional proposition, proposition 5. The way an adherent to psychologism comes to deny 2(c) is by

reading it to demand from the individual an obligation above and beyond all obligations to all other individuals. In other words, the adherent to psychologism will not oppose 2(c) unless 2(c) speaks of a society as a primary entity, unless 2(c) views society as an object of moral duty as a primary entity. Similarly, the adherent to institutionalism will not reject 2(d) unless it conflicts with 2(c): institutionalism has nothing to say in principle against the view of the adherent of psychologism concerning individual obligation until it clashes with higher obligations. Similarly as to 3(c) and 3(d): as such no one denies that both the individual affects society and society affects the individual: these are both readily observed facts of social reality. What the conflict is about is the question, which of these two kinds of influences is primary—and we could declare both as primary, or we could declare neither as primary, thus preventing any possible inconsistency between propositions 3(c) and 3(d). But the acceptance of proposition 5 forces us both to endorse one of these two propositions and to reject the other.

Proposition 5 is very common in the literature, much like proposition 4. But unlike 4, 5 is explicit, and even quite frequently, and then as the common ground, as the proposition shared by the two parties. It is therefore fairly intriguing to examine the relation between propositions 4 and 5. Both are dichotomies: proposition 4 says either (a) or (b), and proposition 5 says either (c) or (d). There is a great temptation to equate (not to say confuse) (a) with (c), as well as (b) with (d). This would force us to declare that propositions 4 and 5 are equivalent: individualism is the same as psychologism and holism is the same as institutionalism.

This identification of the two disputes is traditional in the literature, though as far as I know it is only implicit there: it is Ernest Gellner who, in a debate with Sir Karl Popper and J. W. N. Watkins, has made the identification explicit. (I consider this no mean contribution, and I much regret not having acknowledged it in 1960.)⁴

When we compare propositions 4 and 5 we see that the possible existence of the social wholes which proposition 4 refers to is declared by proposition 5 to be a primary existence. This is very congenial since it clarifies further the situation in that it nails down more precisely the meaning of proposition 4. We can put it in this way: the adherent to psychologistic individualism does not deny 1(a), the claim for the existence of social wholes, such as nations or social classes, in the superficial ordinary sense of 'exist'—in the sense in which entities may exist, yet only thanks to the existence of more primary entities. Rather, his concern is with the exploration of social phenomena, not with reports of their observations: we do observe phenomena which we find easy to report by describing social entities or institutions; but when an explanation describes social entities it cannot be final or satisfactory—the final, or the ultimate, or the primary, or the most satisfactory and complete explanation, he says, should refer to no social entities. In the final

analysis, the psychologistic individualist contends, social wholes do not exist; in more superficial contexts their existence is not denied. We may go the other way and say, proposition 4 clarifies proposition 5: the primary entities which proposition 5 speaks of are ends! Or perhaps entities with their own ends, or aims, destinies, or forces.

And so, propositions 4 and 5 together tell us something about the ideals of social science. They both tell us of the final explanations in the social sciences as those relating to ends. We may replace 4 and 5 with the statement that final explanations relate to ends, individual or social, but not both; this statement will be the common ground of the two contending schools. Propositions 4 and 5 amount to two dichotomies and then their combination unites them. This can be now put schematically, thus:

	<i>Individualism</i>	<i>Holism</i>
Psychologism	I	III
Institutionalism	IV	II

Proposition 4 asserts the horizontal dichotomy, and 5 the vertical one; their combination is the dichotomy between I, individualistic psychologism, and II, institutionalistic holism. Indeed, these are the two traditional options. Option I developed by the more traditional eighteenth-century writers from the classical economists, sociologists, and psychologists. Option II with the romantic nineteenth-century tradition and its offshoots, especially Marxism and functionalism.

IV. INSTITUTIONALISTIC INDIVIDUALISM

The dichotomy between options I and II is not a logical necessity: one may deny it without fear of contradiction. There is at least one, and to my knowledge no more than one, view which not only denies the dichotomy, but also, in fact, all four options: it is orthodox mechanistic, or homeostatic, or cybernetic, theory. But let us remain within the framework of our four options. There are rare examples of writers who abide by option III, or holistic psychologism; the only important instances of it are two, I think: Plato's division of the state into three classes in parallel to the division of the mind into three faculties, and Carl G. Jung's theory of the collective subconscious (and perhaps even its first glimpse in the philosophy of Leibniz). Now, it should be noticed that option III calls for a careful reinterpretation of the propositions 1-3(a) and 1-3(d). This has not been seriously attempted, to my knowledge, with the resultant ambiguity which might be expected. Perhaps the lack of attempts to clear this ambiguity lies in the fact that there are so few writers who endorse alternative III, and they are not clear on many relevant issues. In particular, Plato is not clear because of an inherent ambiguity in the *Republic*—an ambiguity which Popper has explained as

a systematic reluctance to contrast individualism and holism for fear of over-antagonizing the individualistic reader. As far as Carl Jung is concerned, matters are simpler: he is not clear on our issue since anyway it was not his habit to be clear.

We may similarly consider option IV, the institutionalist individualism. It is, indeed, the central purpose of the present essay to advocate for consideration this very option. It is, in other words, the central purpose of the present essay to deny the traditional dichotomy between options I and II.

But one must admit, at first, that there is much to say for the dichotomy between option I and II, i.e., for both proposition 4 and proposition 5. Admittedly these propositions are *prima facie* very convincing. They entail that either *all* statements about societies and social institutions should be taken at their face value or *all* of them should be viewed as shorthand assertions about many individuals. It sounds rather *ad hoc* to claim, as institutionalist-individualists have to claim, that *some* of these statements, say about the state of war between Britain and Germany, have to be taken at their face value, and some of these statements, about Germany's desire to win the war or its fight against Britain, have to be viewed as shorthand assertions about individuals. It sounds quite *ad hoc* to assert the primary existence of Great Britain yet to deny the primary existence of the British interest in the Middle East. This may partly explain the fact that traditionally social philosophers accepted proposition 4 without discussing it.

And yet, in spite of this *prima facie* argument in favour of propositions 4 and 5, let us reject them. Contrary to proposition 4, we may assert that 'wholes' do exist (though, of course, not in the same sense in which people exist), but they have no (distinct) interests. These 'wholes' are social groups as well as social institutions—in the widest sense of the word, and covering a wide variety, from customs to constitutions, and from neighbourhoods to states. An institution may have aims and interests only when people *give it an aim*, or act in accord with what *they consider should be its interest*; a society or an institution cannot have aims and interests of its own. Yet, both the individual and society are now taken as primary, at least in the sense that we cannot reduce psychology into sociology and we cannot reduce sociology into psychology. We shall have to say more about what exactly we mean by primary, because the very claim that both the individual and society are primary, weakens the sense of primariness. It will turn out later that the change is even more radical, that in a sense institutionalistic individualism cannot admit any primary society, namely, in the sense of ideal society, as Popper has amply explained. Here let us see what happens to the 12 propositions in our table of 3 by 4, from 1(a) to 3(d). As we have noted already, (a) and (b) conflict only in the presence of 4 which we reject, and likewise for (c) and (d) in the presence of 5 which we also reject. It

will transpire very quickly that, indeed, the major asset of rejecting 4 and 5 is that consequently we may endorse all of these 12 propositions, though in a slightly modified sense. It so happens, indeed, that in their modified sense they seem much more interesting. Let us quickly survey all 12 propositions now in the manner in which they all cohere with each other.

It is obvious that we can incorporate both 1(a) and 1(b) into a consistent view which is incompatible with both holism and psychologicistic individualism provided that this view contains the negation of proposition 4. And we can incorporate into this view all the other propositions in the above schema provided that they are interpreted not in accordance with proposition 4 but rather in opposition to it. Thus, in 2(a), not the aims of institutions but rather their existence affects the individual's behaviour: the existing institutions constitute a part of the individual's circumstances which together with his aims determine his behaviour in accordance with 2(b). While according to psychologicistic individualism only material conditions may be considered as relevant circumstances, according to institutionalistic individualism the existence of institutions may be considered as relevant circumstances too. This addition enriches 2(b) and turns it from the psychologicistic rationality principle into what Popper calls 'situational logic'. Similarly, 3(a) is admitted as institutional analysis not by admitting that the aims of institutions constrain the individual's behaviour, but by admitting that the existence and characteristics of institutions (as well as people's adoption of definite attitudes towards them) constrain the individual's behaviour, according to the logic of his situation. 3(b) is the theory of institutional reform, of the way people may alter an institutional situation so as to abolish or enforce social constraints, and alter other people's attitudes (by resorting to violence or by democratic means—according to the logic of their situation).

Both 3(a) and 3(b) relate to an important aspect of human behaviour—the *unintended social consequences of individual actions*. The institutional analysis (3(a)) will show how people act under certain circumstances in a way to forward their own aims, and in so doing affect the social system. In particular this will be so when their action is a reform of institutions (3(b)). It is the very combination of 3(a) and 3(b) which renders the unintended consequences so important and which amounts to a theory of social change. It would be deserving of the title 'social dynamics' had not this title been used differently by some sociologists. The holist social dynamics is but a historicist assertion of the goal or destiny of the social whole; it has no explanatory power. The psychologicistic individualist social dynamics is but an idea about the interaction of many individuals; it is far too complicated to be capable of development in any detail. None of these views of social dynamics accord with the following sketch of a simple example of social change. Consider the institutional

circumstances (3(a)) under which some workers find it profitable to organize a trade union for collective bargaining (3(b)). In these new institutional circumstances following the formation of a trade union (3(a)), other workers will find it profitable to organize as well (3(b)). This subsequent situation in which most workers are organized (3(a)) makes it desirable for the employers to organize (3(b)). The existence of both workers' and employers' organizations will profoundly influence the relations between worker and employer (3(a)); and it may even bring about the government's intervention, perhaps in the form of new legislation (3(b)). Thus, unintentionally, the first trade union organizers have started a social avalanche.

So much for the denial of proposition 4. Similar considerations apply to the rejection of proposition 5. Our last example may illustrate how, while denying proposition 5, we can accept both 3(c) and 3(d): individuals are affected by social conditions, and in their turn affect them. Similarly, accepting individual conscience (2(d)) as a source of criticism of society, we can still recognize society as the source and object of that conscience (2(c)), without fear of thereby endorsing collectivist ethics. Here, I should say in parenthesis, I find Popper's theory slightly out of focus: his moral philosophy seems to me to be too often more in accord with psychologistic-individualism (2(d)) than in accord with institutionalistic-individualism (2(c) and 2(d))—a point which can be modified with no great effort. In his *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Popper asserts a distinction between two moralities, the individualistic and the collectivist; he speaks only in passing of an individual's possible obligations to institutions, and this is neither sufficient nor in accord with his moral dichotomy.⁵ For my part, I prefer the theory of the individual's own decision of what is his responsibility to his group, in a manner which forms something of a collective responsibility yet without tribalism and without collectivist ethics. This seems to me to be the obvious moral counterpoint to the social philosophy of institutionalist individualism. Perhaps my preference is rooted in my social conditioning, since this is the Jewish traditional moral approach. For my part, I suppose institutionalist-individualism is the modern social philosophy closest to traditional Jewish attitudes—but this is hard to nail down.⁶

Anyway, option IV, institutionalistic-individualism, incorporates all twelve propositions, 1–3(a–d) mentioned above as interpreted contrary to both proposition 4 and 5.

To all this I should add, in parenthesis, that many thinkers seem to have felt the need for a *via media* between the two traditional views, psychologism and collectivism, and even for a consistent synthesis between the reasonable elements in them. I maintain that Popper and his commentators have finally succeeded in carrying out this intuitively felt programme, thus rendering explicit the approach which in fact underlies the fruitful and reasonable part of existing institutionalist social

studies, while retaining the central thesis of individualism, namely the thesis that only individuals have aims and responsibilities.

Notes

1. An early version of this essay was read late in 1958 in a session of the Sociology Club of the London School of Economics and Political Science, which was given to a public debate between Ernest Gellner and myself. It was a crowded and excited meeting, I remember. I was invited to read the same paper soon after before a study group of the British Sociological Association in London. In November 1960 a brief version of it was published as a first part of a paper 'Methodological Individualism' in the *Brit. J. Sociol.*, vol. 11 (1960), reprinted in John O'Neill, ed., *Modes of Individualism and Collectivism*, London, Heinemann, 1973.

The present version is expanded, in accord with suggestions made by I. C. Jarvie and George K. Zolschan. My gratitude to both of them, as well as to Ernest Gellner, whose most unassuming, tolerant, and encouraging attitude seems in retrospect just marvellous: I do not think I appreciated it enough at the time I most benefited from it.

2. Max Weber, *Basic Concepts of*

Sociology, translated by H. P. Secher, New York, Citadel Press, 1962, para. 1, 9.

3. For the debate on the methodological individualism, see John O'Neill (ed.), *op. cit.* and I. C. Jarvie, *Concepts and Society*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972.

4. E. Gellner's paper 'Holism versus Individualism in History and Sociology'—together with Watkins' attack on it in his 'Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences' and Gellner's reply are published also in Patrick Gardiner (ed.), *Theories of History*, New York, Free Press, 1959. It was also reprinted in his *Contemporary Thought and Politics*, ed. by I. C. Jarvie and J. Agassi, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.

5. K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945; 5th ed., 1966.

6. For further details see my 'Conventions of Knowledge in Talmudic Law' in Bernard S. Jackson (ed.), 'Studies in Jewish Legal History in Honor of David Daube', *J. Jewish Studies*, vol. 25, no. 1 (February 1974), pp. 16-34.